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VICTOR'S JUSTICE: SELECTING
"SITUATIONS" AT THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
WILLIAM

A. SCHABAS*

The great ruling of the International Military Tribunal (IMT),
perhaps better known to non-specialists as the Nuremberg
judgment,' has often been criticized as an exercise in "victor's
justice." The charge has two somewhat different dimensions.
First, procedural shortcomings in the trial and in the application
of substantive norms, including a rather flexible approach to the
rule against non-retroactivity of criminal law, are said to be the
consequence of a conviction-oriented framework imposed by the
four great powers that established the court. A very early ruling of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) said that in devising their Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, "the Judges were conscious of the need to avoid some of
the flaws noted in the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings." 2 But it
is unrealistic to assess trials in 1945 and 1946 by human rights
standards that prevail six decades later, and that have evolved
progressively. On balance, the proceedings certainly met the
highest standards of the time on a procedural level. Many
contemporary critics disliked the Nuremberg process because its
flexible rules of evidence offended their own rather narrow vision
of fairness. These had been conditioned by common law concepts
about the admissibility of hearsay and similar issues. As for the
retroactivity issue, although the nullum crimen sine lege norm is
now presented as a more rigorous and absolute proposition than
perhaps it was in the 1940s, no longer subject to limitation or
derogation, as a practical matter even today's judges adopt a fairly
broad approach aimed at defeating impunity and meting out
punishment to those who deserve it.3 The latest word on this
* Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, Galway
and Director, Irish Centre for Human Rights.
1. France v. Goring, (1948) 22 IMT 203.
2. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 21 (Aug.
10, 1995).
3. CR v. United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 41 (1995); SW v.
36 (1995); Prosecutor v.
United Kingdom, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
Hadiihasanovid, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to
Jurisdiction, 1 58 (Nov. 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL535
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subject is an authoritative decision by the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights that upholds the legitimacy of
the Nuremberg trial.4
The second critique is more substantial: the IMT breached
fundamental principles of justice because it only judged one side.
War crimes and other atrocities perpetrated by the victors,
ranging from the Katyn massacre to the dreadful bombings of
cities in Germany and Japan, including the nuclear destruction of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, remain unpunished. It is the point that
is featured in a recent study of the Nuremberg trial by notorious
Holocaust denier David Irving.5 This sort of moral equivalence
takes an especially obnoxious form in slogans of some German
neo-Nazis: Auschwitz + Dresden = 0.
But such a dismissive view of Nuremberg is not limited to
extremists, and finds much currency in the academic literature of
international criminal justice. Recently, in proceedings before the
European Court of Human Rights, Latvia argued that the
prosecution in the 1990s of an anti-Nazi partisan "helped to make
up for the inadequacies of the Nuremberg trial, a trial that had to
a large extent been an example of justice for the victors, punishing
crimes perpetrated by the Nazis, while allowing notorious criminal
acts by the Allies to go unpunished."6 Similar critiques were made
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE),
also known as the "Tokyo Trial." They were dramatically
highlighted in the famous dissent by Judge Pal. He was concerned
both about the retroactivity issue and the one-sided nature of the
proceedings. For Judge Pal, the European allies in the Pacific
conflict were just as egregious as the Japanese, and he
consequently voted to acquit all of the defendants.7
When the post-war trials were concluded, international
criminal justice went into a long period of hibernation. Most
observers attribute this to the tensions of the Cold War. With a
growing emphasis in the human rights movement on
accountability for atrocity crimes, and an altered political climate
that came with the fall of the Berlin Wall, proposals for an
international criminal court began to revive during the 1980s. The
first manifestation of changing attitudes was the establishment of
2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of
25 (May 31, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment),
Milutinovid, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdani6's Motion
Challenging Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise,1 37 (May 21, 2003).
4. See generally Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04 [GC], Judgment
(May 17, 2010).
5. See generally DAVID IRVING, NUREMBERG: THE LAST BATTLE (Focal
Point 1996).
6. Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04, Judgment, T 92 (July 24, 2008).
7. NEIL BOISTER & ROBERT CRYER, DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 811-930 (Oxford University Press 2008).
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the ICTY in May 1993.8 Although its substantive law faithfully
reflected the post-Second World War precedents, mainly out of a
concern to avoid charges of retroactive punishment, the new court
was held out as a progressive development over Nuremberg
because it had been created by the United Nations Security
Council ("Security Council"), acting in the name of the
"international community," rather than by one or more of the
victors. At that time, in any event, there were no victors in the
Balkan wars. An early decision of the Tribunal said
[t]he Nuremberg and Tokyo trials have been characterized as
'victor's justice' because only the vanquished were charged with
violations of international humanitarian law and the defendants
were prosecuted and punished for crimes expressly defined in an
instrument adopted by the victors at the conclusion of the war.
Therefore, the International Tribunal is distinct from its closest
precedents.9

The Statute of the ICTY specified that the Prosecutor was to "act
independently as a separate organ of the International Tribunal.
He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any
Government or from any other source."'0 By contrast, there was no
similar requirement imposed upon the four prosecutors at
Nuremberg. They were designated by their governments and,
presumably, took instructions from them regarding the selection of
defendants."
But while this independence of the ICTY seemed a significant
development compared with Nuremberg, the institution was in
fact an emanation of the Security Council. As such, its political
agenda was set by what at Nuremberg were still referred to as the
"great powers" but by 1993 were labeled with the perhaps less
pejorative term of the "permanent five." In substance,
nevertheless, the creators of the ICTY were not all that different
than those who established the Nuremberg Tribunal, although the
institution was not destined for those whom they had vanquished.
Serbs in particular were not overly impressed by claims that this
was a neutral product of the "international community." 12
8. S.C. Res. 827, 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
9. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's

Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses,

21, (Aug.

10, 1995).

10. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia art. 16(2), May 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827.
11. MICHAEL SALTER, NAZI WAR CRIMES, US INTELLIGENCE AND SELECTIVE
PROSECUTIONS AT NUREMBERG: CONTROVERSIES REGARDING THE ROLE OF

THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (Routledge-Cavendish 2007).
12. See generally, for example, ALEKSANDAR JOKId, WAR CRIMES AND
COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING (Blackwell 2001); Robert M. Hayden, Biased
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The debate has been even more acute at the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Until today, the Prosecutor
resisted entreaties that he prosecute the "flip side" cases, that is,
atrocities committed by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic
Front (RPF) in the aftermath of the genocide. The nongovernmental organization Human Rights Watch charged that the
ICTR would not properly complete its mandate if it did not mete
out justice to both sides. A letter from the organization to the
Prosecutor states:
It would be a failure of justice-not merely victor's justice-if you do
not vigorously investigate and prosecute senior RPF officials
because they are currently senior officials or military leaders in
Rwanda. 13 [Moreover,] [flailure to do so will taint perceptions of the
Tribunal's impartiality and undermine its legitimacy for years to
come.1
The architects of the International Criminal Court (ICC) were
very conscious of these issues. In the negotiations on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute"), the
debate about political interference in prosecutorial discretion took
place principally in the context of the triggering mechanisms.
Unlike Nuremberg, Tokyo, and the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC is a
permanent body that cannot automatically exercise its
jurisdiction; it must be "triggered."1 5 In this sense, the earlier
institutions were already "triggered" by the political bodies that
created them. The situations over which the tribunals could
exercise jurisdiction were determined at the time of their
establishment, leaving the prosecutors to select the cases within
this narrow ambit. Perhaps the clearest example takes us back to
the start of it all: Versailles.
In the 1919 Treaty of Peace, the Allied and Associated Powers
publicly arraigned William II of Hohenzollern, formerly the
German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties.16 Had the proposed

"Justice:"Humanrightsism and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 549 (1999).

13. Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch,
to Hassan Jallow, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal of
Rwanda (Aug. 14, 2009) available at http://www.hrw.orglen/news/2009/08/

14/letter-ictr-chief-prosecutor-hassan-jallow-response-his-letter-prosecutio
n-rpf-crim. See also Rwanda: Tribunal Risks Supporting 'Victor's Justice',
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 1, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/

06/01/Rwanda-tribunal-risks-supporting-victor-s-justice (arguing that failure
to prosecute RPF officials is conveying the message that the ICC is another
version of "victor's justice").
14. Letter from Kenneth Roth to Hassan Jallow, supra note 13.
15. See generally HtcTOR OIASOLO, THE TRIGGERING PROCEDURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005).

16. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and
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international tribunal actually been established following the First
World War, its prosecutor would have had no discretion
whatsoever in either the selection of a "situation" or the choice of
the defendant. By contrast, at Nuremberg, the four prosecutors
were free to pick the accused persons, provided the latter could be
credibly described as "major war criminals of the European Axis,"
which was the expression used in the Charter of the IMT. The
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda also allow the prosecutors to select the defendants, to the
extent that the crimes themselves fell within the territorial and
temporal jurisdiction established by the Security Council.' 7 It is on
this very key aspect where the ICC represents such a departure
from previous models.
At the ICC, the triggering of jurisdiction was originally
conceived by the International Law Commission to lie with either
the Security Council or the States Parties.s According to its 1994
draft, even triggering by States Parties was subject to a restriction
to the extent that the situation was being considered by the
Security Council. In practice, then, the initial proposal that
constituted the starting point for negotiations under the auspices
of the United Nations General Assembly gave the Security Council
effective control over the selection of situations. Such a court
would be no different in substance from its predecessors, to the
extent that the selection of situations would lie with a political
body. For that matter, it wasn't just any political body, but the
Security Council, dominated by the five permanent members. In
effect, then, it would be Nuremberg all over again, except a
permanent and not a temporary version. The "great powers" would
decide the targets of prosecutions, secure that their own special
interests would be protected by the veto.
In the negotiations that followed, resulting in adoption of the
Rome Statute, the domination of the Court by the Security Council
was significantly weakened. To a great extent, small and medium
powers attempted to do indirectly what they could not do directly:
create an institution that had a degree of independence from the
Security Council and that could act without its approval.
Although much of this was both inspired and driven by
Germany art. 227, June 28, 1919, TS 4 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
17. There may have been some limitation on this imposed by the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence as a result of the completion strategy. See, for
example, Rule 28(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, as amended on
April 6, 2004. The Special Court for Sierra Leone has its jurisdiction limited to
"those who bear the greatest responsibility" for international crimes.
18. ILC, Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n to the General Assembly, 15-73, 4345, deliverd to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 1/49/10 (July 22, 1994),
Doc.
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N.
reprinted in [1994]
A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l.
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unhappiness with the Security Council as the organ of control, the
debate was usually framed as being about the independence and
impartiality of the proposed court. In other words, the issue was
not conceived of as one of replacing the Security Council with a
more democratic and legitimate body empowered to select the
situations over which the Court would exercise jurisdiction.
Rather, it was argued that Security Council involvement be
rejected because of the alleged impermissibility of any form of
political control over the selection of situations. In this way, it was
thought that such a purely judicial institution would constitute a
major improvement on the "victor's justice" stigma that had
afflicted international prosecution since Nuremberg.
This primarily manifests itself in two provisions of the Rome
Statute, Articles 15 and 16. Article 15 allows the Prosecutor to
select situations on his own initiative, without any form of control
by a political body. His action is subject only to approval by a PreTrial Chamber composed of three judges, who are to assess the
selection of a situation in light of purely judicial criteria. There
was nothing comparable to Article 15 in the draft statute adopted
by the International Law Commission. Its proposal and eventual
adoption were part of the process of weakening the Security
Council's control over the Court.
Article 16 allows the Security Council to intervene and stop a
prosecution, but only temporarily. It is a much diluted version of
the provision in the International Law Commission draft that
effectively required the Security Council to provide a green light
before the Court could proceed to deal with a situation.1 9 In its
final form, Article 16 still allows the Security Council the right to
impose a red light, by means of an affirmative resolution, but this
must be renewed annually. Most states would have preferred that
Article 16 disappear altogether. Its inclusion in the Rome Statute
was a compromise whose success was largely due to the fact that
there was a breaking of ranks among the permanent members
themselves, with the United Kingdom agreeing to accept the
revised provision in the months prior to the Rome Conference. 20
The legality of Article 16 remains a matter of debate, given
that by purporting to fetter the authority of the Security Council,
it is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. In the event of
conflict, it is beyond doubt that the Charter takes precedence over
any incompatible treaty, such as the Rome Statute. Although they
do not make a point of saying so, perhaps in order not to offend the
19. Id.
20. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15 July 17, 1998, Proposalby the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Irelandon Article 54 Quater, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.3 (June 23,
1998).
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sensibilities of many states, the five permanent members of the
Security Council probably believe that, despite Article 16, they
have the power to suspend proceedings indefinitely.
Thus, the ICC is not entirely free of external political control
in the selection of situations, 21 but it nevertheless represents a
considerable development in this respect even when measured
against the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Control by the Security Council remains, but in a
weakened form, and its prior authorization is not a sine qua non
for the beginning of investigations and prosecutions. The
Prosecutor may still be directed to deal with a situation by the
Security Council, or by a State Party, but he may exercise his own
discretion in refusing to do so. Article 53 of the Rome Statute says
he may refuse such triggering by the Security Council or a State
Party "in the interests of justice," a vague expression that
effectively leaves him with a free hand. In theory, the Security
Council or the State Party, as the case may be, may challenge the
Prosecutor's decision before the Court. In practice, it is hard to
imagine how even the judges will be able to force the Prosecutor to
proceed where he chooses not to, given that this requires an
allocation of scarce resources that only the Prosecutor can make.
The Prosecutor could simply respond to an order from the Court
with which he disagreed by assigning responsibility over the
situation or the case to the international equivalent of Inspecteur
Jacques Clouseau, confident that there would be no effective
result.
Consequently, the authority for the selection of situations lies,
for all intents and purposes, with the Prosecutor of the Court. He
may either select situations himself, acting proprio motu pursuant
to Article 15, as is the case with the first three situations to come
before the Court, or he may instigate States Parties to make the
referral in accordance with Article 15. Thus, for the first time, we
have an international criminal tribunal where the choice of
situations for prosecution is the prerogative of a judicial official
within the institution and not a political body outside it. For most
supporters of the Court, this is viewed as its great strength. The
Court is largely, if not purely, "depoliticized." The "victor's justice"
charge is thereby defeated.

21. According to a Pre-Trial Chamber, "[slituations, which are generally
defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some cases personal
parameters, such as the situation in the territory of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo since 1 July 2002, entail the proceedings envisaged in the Statute
to determine whether a particular situation should give rise to a criminal
investigation as well as the investigation as such." ICC, Situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo: Decision on Applications for Participation
in the Proceedingsof VPRS-1, VPRS-2, VPRS-3, VPRS-4, VPRS-5, VPRS-6,
65, ICC-01/04 (Jan. 17, 2006).
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Thinking in this respect is often coloured by analogies with
domestic justice systems, where the idea of a politicized prosecutor
is quite repulsive. In a functional justice system displaying the
attributes of the rule of law, all serious crimes against the person
will be prosecuted. Case law has confirmed that this is an
obligation that flows from international human rights treaties as
an entitlement of victims. 22 Many states whose legislation permits
the exercise of universal jurisdiction over international atrocity
crimes committed abroad often require a form of political
authorization (really, "triggering") before a prosecution may be
undertaken, 23 but this is an exception to the general rule.
Mechanistic extrapolation based upon the model of the national
prosecution to the context of international criminal tribunals is
fundamentally flawed because there is no expectation that all
perpetrators of serious international crimes will be brought to
justice by such institutions.
why
reason explaining
One simple and adequate
international criminal tribunals do not aspire to prosecute all
international crimes within their jurisdiction when these go
unpunished by national courts is that there are simply not enough
resources. The Prosecutor of the ICC recently set out a three-year
strategic plan in which he expected to complete the three trials
now underway or about to begin, and to start "at least one new
trial." 24 In addition, he said he intended to continue ongoing
investigations in seven cases, and conduct "up to four new
investigations of cases." 25 Assuming he fulfils these goals, that
will mean that in its first nine years of operation the ICC will have
completed trials of four people, started the trial of another
individual, and investigated cases involving a further eleven
individuals, for a total of sixteen. By comparison, the ICTY had
completed twenty-three cases after nine years of operation.
Coincidentally, the Nuremberg tribunal also judged twenty-three
people, completing its trial less than fourteen months after its
work began. 26 The purpose of this observation is not to criticize

102-107 (2003)
22. See, e.g., MC v. Bulgaria, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.
(applying relevant modern standards in international law).
23. See, e.g., Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c.
24, § 9(3) (stating that an action can only proceed with written consent from
the Attorrney General or Deputy Attorney General of Canada).
24. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, ProsecutorialStrategy, 2009 - 2012, 2
(Feb. 1, 2010) available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC3650-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/OTPPProsecutorialStrategy2009201
3.pdf.
25. Id.
26. U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugo. since 1991, Aug. 1, 2002 - July 31, 2003, 7279 U.N. Doc. A/58/297/S/2003/829 (Aug. 20, 2003).
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the output of the Office of the Prosecutor, but rather to show the
effective limits on the workload of the Court. With 113 States
Parties, and credible allegations of crimes falling within the
jurisdiction of the Court in a variety of situations around the
globe, the Prosecutor obviously has to make choices. The question
is on what basis does he make them?
In one sense, the reality is not unlike that which confronted
previous international prosecutors. At Nuremberg, for example,
the international prosecutors selected twenty-four cases for trial,
but many more defendants could have been considered. The goal
was to provide a representative sample of Nazi evil. Arguably, the
Nuremberg prosecutors succeeded in doing so. At the ICTY, the
rationale has evolved. In the early years, the prosecutors seemed
to settle for any villain they could get their hands on, no matter
how insignificant the individual might have been in the general
scheme of atrocity. Over time, the choice of defendants became
more focussed, concentrating on leaders. At the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Prosecutor identified representatives of
three different combatant factions. Nobody would suggest that
every individual deserving of prosecution was actually charged at
Nuremberg, or by the ad hoc tribunals. Many have gone
unpunished, and will remain so. The United Nations accepts the
situation to the extent that it limits the work of the tribunals
through allocation of resources.
But there is a big difference between the Prosecutor of the
ICC and the prosecutors of the ad hoc tribunals. The former not
only selects the individual defendants, he must also pronounce on
the choice of the "situation." At the ad hoc tribunals, the selection
of the situation was a preliminary, a fundamental policy choice
made by political bodies. The Security Council never tried to
justify an exhaustive approach, whereby it has established an
international tribunal in every crisis where impunity reigns. The
reasons why it elected to focus on the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, and, much later, Lebanon, are inscrutable to the
extent that they represent compromises by government
negotiators acting on the basis of national interests. They certainly
do not respond to any consistent and coherent criteria that could
be subjected to judicial scrutiny.
Perhaps the most recent ad hoc institution, the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, provides the starkest example. It was
established to deal with a single assassination committed in
Lebanon in February 2005, yet the Tribunal is without jurisdiction
to adjudicate credible allegations of war crimes perpetrated on the
very same territory the following year during the conflict between
Israel and Hezbollah. When questioned about such inconsistency,
most observers merely shrug their shoulders. The double standard
is a fact of life about which we may grumble but do little else.
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Our hopes for the Prosecutor of the ICC are much higher,
however. The independent proprio motu Prosecutor was held out
as the answer to charges of politically motivated trials. However,
he cannot act the way a national prosecutor would because the
resources to prosecute all serious international crimes within the
Court's jurisdiction do not exist. Like the prosecutors at the ad hoc
tribunals, he can only select a handful of cases within any given
situation. But unlike those same prosecutors, he must also select a
handful of situations from among many that cry out for the Court's
attention. The Rome Statute offers no real guidance on the criteria
that the Prosecutor is to apply in making determinations about
which situations to pursue and which ones to ignore. Perhaps it
was assumed that a wise Prosecutor would know what to do.
Although no international prosecutor has ever been so prolix as
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, on this most difficult of issues the
Prosecutor has provided little clarification with respect to the
factors that he considers in exercising his discretion. In practice,
does he also select situations based upon political factors?
Most of the attempts at explanation by the Office of the
Prosecutor focus on "gravity." The website of the Office of the
Prosecutor explains that "[i]n 2004, the Office independently
selected the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
("DRC") and Northern Uganda as the gravest admissible
situations under the jurisdiction of the Court."27 This statement
seems to confirm the fact that the so-called "self-referrals" of these
situations were an exercise of Article 14 of the Statute in name
only. The application to open an investigation in Kenya sets out a
number of reasons justifying the gravity of the situation, including
the impact on victims. 28 But there is nothing in the application to
indicate why the situation in Kenya is more compelling than other
situations elsewhere in the world that may fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court. Perhaps the Prosecutor did not feel he
needed to justify this aspect of his discretion in an application to
the Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 15. Still, he needs to justify it
to the general public.
In February 2006, the Prosecutor addressed selection criteria
when he explained his decision not to proceed on the basis of
complaints filed concerning the behaviour of British troops in Iraq
since the 2003 invasion. This is about as close as he has come to
providing criteria for selection of situations in a concrete case:
Even where there is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime has

27. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT - INVESTIGATIONS, http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Investig
ations/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
28. ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Request for authorizationof an
investigationpursuantto Article 15, 1 56-59, ICC-01/09 (Nov. 26, 2009).
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been committed, this is not sufficient for the initiation of an
investigation by the International Criminal Court. The Statute then
requires consideration of admissibility before the Court, in light of
the gravity of the crimes and complementarity with national
systems.
While, in a general sense, any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court is "grave", the Statute requires an additional threshold of
gravity even where the subject-matter jurisdiction is satisfied. This
assessment is necessary as the Court is faced with multiple
situations involving hundreds or thousands of crimes and must
select situations in accordance with the Article 53 criteria.
For war crimes, a specific gravity threshold is set down in Article
8(1), which states that "the Court shall have jurisdiction in respect
of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or
policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes". This
threshold is not an element of the crime, and the words "in
particular" suggest that this is not a strict requirement. It does,
however, provide Statute guidance that the Court is intended to
focus on situations meeting these requirements.
According to the available information, it did not appear that any of
the criteria of Article 8(1) were satisfied.
Even if one were to assume that Article 8(1) had been satisfied, it
would then be necessary to consider the general gravity requirement
under Article 53(1)(b). The Office considers various factors in
assessing gravity. A key consideration is the number of victims of
particularly serious crimes, such as wilful killing or rape. The
number of potential victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court in this situation-4 to 12 victims of wilful killing and a
limited number of victims of inhuman treatment-was of a different
order than the number of victims found in other situations under
investigation or analysis by the Office. It is worth bearing in mind
that the OTP is currently investigating three situations involving
long-running conflicts in Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic
of Congo and Darfur. Each of the three situations under
investigation involves thousands of wilful killings as well as
intentional and large-scale sexual violence and abductions.
Collectively, they have resulted in the displacement of more than 5
million people. Other situations under analysis also feature
hundreds or thousands of such crimes.
Taking into account all the considerations, the situation did not
appear to meet the required threshold of the Statute.
In light of the conclusion reached on gravity, it was unnecessary to
9
reach a conclusion on complementarity.

29. Office of the Prosecutor, Letter dated Feb. 9, 2006, from Luis MorenoOcampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 8-9 available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int[NR/rdonlyres/F596DO8D-D810-43A2-99BB-B899B9C
5BCD2/277422/OTP letterto_sendersreIraq_9SFebruary_2006.pdf.
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The Prosecutor's comments appear to muddle the distinction
between a "situation" and a "case." Was he in fact talking about
the specific cases of wilful killing and inhuman treatment in Iraq,
which he said were not very significant in terms of quantity?
Perhaps, except that he was comparing them, for the sake of
assessing whether to launch an investigation into a "situation,"
with "the three situations under investigation" in Africa, each of
which "involves thousands of wilful killings as well as intentional
and large-scale sexual violence and abductions." Leaving aside the
fact that quantity alone is not adequate as a measurement of
"gravity," something the Prosecutor later acknowledged,30 and a
Pre-Trial Chamber has confirmed,31it is common knowledge that
the human suffering in Iraq resulting from war crimes related to
the invasion by the United Kingdom exceeds fifteen or twenty
victims!
Very early in the work of the Office of the Prosecutor, draft
regulations were prepared and circulated. 32 The Prosecutor is
required to put in place regulations to govern the operation,
management and administration of the Office of the Prosecutor.33
These draft regulations approached the matter of selection of
situations in a manner that suggested the Prosecutor would
proceed with everything that was admissible. There was a complex
procedure, involving "evaluation teams" and a "draft investigation
plan," leading to a decision by the Prosecutor:
Upon conclusion of the preliminary examination or article 53(1)
evaluation, the decision to start an investigation under article 53(1)
or to request authorisation to commence an investigation from the
Pre-Trial Chamber pursuant to article 15(3) is made by the Chief
Prosecutor, taking into consideration the draft investigation plan,
the recommendation by the Deputy Prosecutor (Investigations) and
the Deputy Prosecutor (Prosecutions) and all other information
available to him or her on the given situation. 34
The accompanying footnote 77 said:
According to rule 11, the inherent powers of the Prosecutor under
articles 15 and 53 cannot be delegated to any member of the Office

30. ICC, Situation in Darfur, Sudan:Summary of the Prosecutor's
Application under Article 58, 7, ICC 02/05 (Nov. 20, 2008).
31. ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Decision Pursuant to Article 15
of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation
in the Republic of Kenya, 1 62 ICC 01/09 (Mar. 31, 2010).
32. See generally ICC-OTP, Draft Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor

(annotated),ICC-OTP (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter Draft Regulations].
33. ICC-ASP, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 9, ICC Doc. ICCASP/1/3 (2002). See also ICC, Regulationsof the Court, reg. 7(1)(e), ICC-BD/0101-04 (2004).
34. Draft Regulations, supra note 32, reg.12.1 (reference omitted).
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other than to a Deputy Prosecutor.35
This was the height of absurdity. How could a court with such
limited resources-incapable, as time has shown, of finishing a
single trial in seven years-possibly be in a position to
contemplate investigation and prosecution of every admissible
situation? And yet the draft Regulations provided nothing to
indicate on what basis the Prosecutor would exercise his
discretion-what the footnote called his "inherent powers"-in
determining to which of the many potentially admissible
situations he should devote his attention. Much later, in 2009, the
Regulations were finally adopted. This was in a much abbreviated
form by comparison with the original draft. Regulation 29 governs
the selection of situations:
Regulation 29. Initiation of an investigation or prosecution
1. In acting under article 15, paragraph 3, or article 53, paragraph
1, the Office shall produce an internal report analysing the
seriousness of the information and considering the factors set out in
article 53, paragraph 1 (a) to (c), namely issues of jurisdiction,
admissibility (including gravity), as well as the interests of justice,
pursuant to rules 48 and 104. The report shall be accompanied by a
recommendation on whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate
an investigation.
2. In order to assess the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed in
the situation the Office shall consider various factors including their
scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact.
3. Based on the report, the Prosecutor shall determine whether
36
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.
The emphasis on gravity was an important addition. The
word had been used only once in the 2003 version of the draft
regulations, in what was essentially a reprise of Article 53.37
Probably at that time, nobody in the Office of the Prosecutor
thought that the concept of "gravity" was very significant in the
selection of situations or of cases. For that matter, the term
"gravity," which appears in the Statute in two places relevant to
the selection of cases and situations,38 had not figured in any
significant manner in the early pronouncements of the Office of
the Prosecutor.
That changed in late 2005, when the Prosecutor invoked the
gravity issue in order to explain his decision to proceed against the
leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda rather than
35. Id. (emphasis in original).
36. ICC-BD, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09
(Apr. 23, 2009).

37. Draft Regulations, supra note 32, reg.12.2(c).
38. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 17(1), 53, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
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against those of the government forces.39 A few months later, as
noted above, "gravity" also formed the centrepiece of his
explanation concerning the situation in Iraq. Although it has
never been officially released, in June 2006 a draft document
entitled "Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases" was
circulated. It implied that the selection of situations by the
Prosecutor would be based upon "gravity." The "Criteria" stated
that "[i]n the view of the [Office of the Prosecutor], factors relevant
to assessing gravity include: a) the scale of the crimes; b) the
nature of the crimes; c) the manner of commission of the crimes; d)
the impact of the crimes."40 The draft document said that "these
factors should be considered jointly: no fixed weight should be
assigned to the criteria, but rather a judgment will have to be
reached on the facts and circumstances of each situation."4 1 From
virtual silence in 2003, the notion of "gravity" has now become
quite central to the Prosecutor's discourse about selection of
situations.
Does it really make sense that an objective application of the
gravity criteria proposed in materials from the Office of the
Prosecutor leads inexorably to five contiguous states in Central
Africa? Can this be a simple coincidence, the unintended
conjuncture of the objective application of selection criteria? Is
there possibly some sort of policy determination that is involved?
Certainly, many states, especially States Parties in the global
north, and particularly the non-party state that has become one of
the keener supporters of the Court in the last few years, the
United States of America, seem very comfortable with such a
focus. There is much interest in the warming of the United States
to the Court, which many attribute to the new administration.
Actually, the process was underway well before the 2008 election.
It seems to be as much related to the fact that the Court's
priorities correspond to the strategic interests of the United
States, and most certainly do not threaten them, as it is to the
more progressive multilateralism of President Obama and
Secretary of State Clinton.
The Prosecutor regularly insists that his actions and decisions
are based on judicial and not political factors. But if this is really
the case, then we need a better explanation for the current choice

39. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo,
Prosecutorof the InternationalCriminal Court at an Informal meeting of Legal
Advisors of Ministries of ForeignAffairs, 7 (Oct. 24, 2005); ICC, Office of the
Prosecutor,Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutorof the International
Criminal Court at the Fourth Session of the Assembly of States Parties, 2
(Nov. 28, 2005).
40. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor,Int'l Crim. Ct., Criteriafor Selection of
Situations and Cases, 5 (June 2006) (unpublished draft document).
4 1. Id.

2010]

Victor's Justice

549

of situations. The "gravity" language strikes the observer as little
more than obfuscation, a contrived attempt to make the
determinations look objective and judicial. The seriousness of the
situations in Central Africa is unquestioned. However, there are
many serious situations in the territories of the 113 States Parties
to the Rome Statute, or elsewhere in the world but involving
nationals of States Parties. Nor are these observations meant to
attack the good faith of those involved in these determinations
who have undoubtedly convinced themselves that they have found
a legalistic formula enabling them to do the impossible, namely, to
make what is inexorably a political decision but without making it
look political.
What does all of this have to do with the "victor's justice"
issue? It has been the label attached to international trials
allegedly tainted with the politics of those who established them.
The critique suggests that matters partially improved at the ad
hoc tribunals, compared with Nuremberg and Tokyo. Only with
the ICC, and its proprio motu Prosecutor, has the problem been
solved, goes the explanation. But has it? In reality, what we have
at the ICC is a political determination but with less transparency,
not more. This is not to suggest that the Prosecutor receives
instructions from some clandestine committee of political advisors
and foreign intelligence agencies, only that he is compelled to
select situations where objective, judicial criteria alone do not
suffice. The discretion of the Prosecutor in selecting situations
under Article 15, and in agreeing to proceed with selections that
have already been referred by the Security Council or by States
Parties, pursuant to Articles 13(b) and 14 respectively, has an
inherently political dimension. Even when the situation has been
selected, political choices are also made in terms of which parties
to a conflict are to be targeted for prosecution.
The quest for the judicial Prosecutor, one who is above
politics, and one who is modelled on domestic prosecutors where
all serious crimes against the person are addressed regardless of
political considerations, is like looking for the Emerald City. It is
as elusive as the search for the end of the rainbow. For this reason,
the Rome Statute is incomplete. The thesis in this ariticle is that
the Prosecutor does, in fact, make political choices. He does not
seriously consider for prosecution all admissible situations that
fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. There is, in fact, a coterie
of advisers based in what is called the "Jurisdiction,
Complementarity and Cooperation Unit," who assist with this
political guidance. Possibly external experts are also consulted
from time to time. Often, spokespersons for the Office of the
Prosecutor acknowledge the role of political considerations in the
selection of situations.
But on his own-and the Statute makes this a matter of pure
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discretion-the Prosecutor is not selected for his political skills or
judgment, nor does his personal experience and training suggest
this is his strong suit. The problem here is not only transparency
but also accountability. By contrast, the Security Council, which is
responsible for the political triggering and guidance of the ad hoc
tribunals, operates somewhat in the open, and its members are
responsible not only to the international community as a whole
but also to their national political constituencies.
The challenge of political guidance may be one factor that
explains the lacklustre performance of the Court in its first seven
years of activity. The ad hoc tribunals, and Nuremberg and Tokyo
before them, succeeded not only because of the political forces that
established them, but also due to the political consensus that
supported their work. The most famous of the cases, Milosevic and
Taylor, were only able to proceed because of widespread political
backing in the regions affected by the conflicts for the idea that
they be brought to justice. In the most celebrated case to come
before the ICC, that of Omar Al-Bashir, such support is weak or
entirely absent in the part of the world where it is most needed.
The ICC continues to plod along, consistently failing in the
targets that it has itself set. Six years ago, the Prosecutor
proposed a budget that was based upon the proposition that "[i]n
2005, the Office plans to conduct one full trial, begin a second and
carry out two new investigations." 42 A flow chart derived from the
Prosecutor's forecasts indicated that the first trial before the Court
would be completed by August 2005.43 He became somewhat less
ambitious in 2006, when a three-year strategic plan proclaimed
the expectation that the Court would complete two "expeditious
trials [by 2009], and .

.

. conduct four to six new investigations."44

In fact, by 2009 not even one trial was even close to completion.
Given that holding trials is the core activity of the Court,
these projections reflect an unrealistic assessment of the
difficulties facing the institution. Indeed, such fanciful evaluations
of the Court's present and its future continue. The upcoming
Review Conference will devote considerable time to "stocktaking."
But there is no traction for using the occasion to undertake a
critical assessment that attempts to fathom the causes of the
Court's inadequacies. Rather, the "stocktaking" is likely to be an
exercise in self-congratulation, with inadequate cooperation by
States being labeled as the main culprit responsible for the Court's
current malaise. It is submitted in this article that it is the lack of
political direction to the Prosecutor that has contributed
42. ICC-ASP, Assembly of States Parties, Draft Programme Budget for
2005, T 159, ICC-ASP/3/2 (July 26, 2004).
43. Id. at 49.
44. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor,Report on ProsecutorialStrategy, 3 (Sept.
14, 2006).
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significantly to making the work of the Court so complicated.
Precisely for this reason, at least in part, it is a poor performer
when compared with the other international criminal tribunals.
There is a solution to the problem of political direction in the
Rome Statute, but it is an unacceptable one. Article 16 allows for
political factors to intervene, in the form of the Security Council
staying proceedings before the Court. When the African Union
(AU) requested that the Court hold back on a prosecution of the
Sudanese president, the answer from the supporters of the Court
was that this matter should be addressed pursuant to Article 16.
Those who invoked the argument may have forgotten that Article
16 remained in the Statute during the negotiations as a concession
to buy the acquiescence of the permanent members of the Security
Council. It was never intended to provide a scheme for the exercise
of political discretion where a situation or a case is otherwise
admissible. The AU proposal to amend Article 16 to add a
reference to the General Assembly strikes at the heart of this
conundrum. Some claim it will only "further politicize" the Court.
But if the Court is already politicized, why should the Security
Council have the monopoly? At a minimum, the AU amendment
fingers the problem of political control, even if it does not solve it.
Certainly an answer has to be found, so that the selection of
situations by the Prosecutor rests on solid political judgment that
finds support from States Parties and, preferably, the broader
international community, rather than on the pretence that this is
a judicial matter devoid of politics.
Does this mean that the ICC, like its predecessors, is
condemned to the taint of "victor's justice"? Only if we are not
prepared to contest some rather widely accepted misconceptions
about prior experiments in international justice. The charge that
Nuremberg was flawed because the victors judged those they had
defeated must be challenged. It is true that war crimes committed
by the Allied Forces during the Second World War went
unpunished, but they cannot be in any way compared with the
atrocities for which the Nazis were responsible. To make such a
statement is, of course, a reflection of the author's world view.
There is no pretence that political considerations are absent in
such an assessment.
Those who complain that Nuremberg was unfair should be
asked to describe what they think the proceedings should have
looked like. Given that there was one trial of twenty-three Nazi
leaders, does this mean there should also have been another trial
of twenty-three American leaders and twenty-three British
leaders? That would be an even greater distortion of history than
any message that might emerge from the Nuremberg trial
suggesting the Allies were innocent of any wrongdoing. But how,
then, are we to get the correct proportions? The same problem
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arises today, when Human Rights Watch claims the Prosecutor of
the ICTR risks the stigma of "victor's justice" if he does not
prosecute Tutsi generals. How many is he supposed to charge in
order to cleanse himself of the charge, and to restore the
Tribunal's credibility and restorative function? There have been
approximately seventy indictments at the Tribunal to date, all of
them directed against alleged ginocidaires. Should an equal
number of Tutsi be charged, or perhaps a much smaller number in
order to reflect the disparity in the number of victims (and
possibly the greater gravity of genocide)?
So-called problems of even-handed prosecution, where all
sides in a conflict bear the brunt of prosecutorial attention, are not
actually resolved because a sampling of suspects from one party is
pursued in order to defeat the allegation of victor's justice. The
debates continue, and when one side feels that the correct
proportions have been reached, the other will complain that the
strategy is abusive and unfair. Sometimes, proponents of this
quest for balance explain that it is a pre-requisite to reconciliation.
But this is a speculative hypothesis, based upon intuition rather
than evidence. Using courts to demonstrate that both sides in a
conflict were at fault may just as easily aggravate tensions and
perpetuate a sense of injustice rather than promote the idea that
justice has been done. Did the one-sided prosecutions of Nazis
produce a negative result? Actually, the Nuremberg trial probably
contributed to a shared narrative, one common to victor and
vanquished alike, that has promoted the building of a modern
Europe that is democratic, pluralist, and, above all, peaceful.
Following the example of the IMT, German domestic courts have
pursued justice for Nazi offenders, a process that continues to this
day. It has never been seriously suggested that German courts
prosecute British airmen for bombing their cities, although there
would not be any real legal obstacle. The German authorities, like
those of the victors in 1945, have made a wise policy choice. For
these reasons, justice in such areas cannot be the preserve of the
courts, the way it is at the domestic level. Inevitably, it is a
mixture of the judicial and the political. The challenge for those
involved in the judicial wing of this process is to ensure the
greatest legitimacy without at the same time encouraging the
myth that what they are doing is devoid of any political dimension.

